DOI: 10.33917/mic-2.127.2026.98-111

The mechanism of cyclical interaction of institutions of budgetary, tax and monetary policy is revealed, as a result of which there is an initially unpredictable misalignment between formally logical decisions of individual regulators obtained within the framework of the traditional axiom of transitivity as a key criterion of rationality of actions. The emergence of these cycles, known as «institutional traps», is due to the objective non-transitivity of external and internal preference or superiority relationships between the institutions and their elements. The essence of «institutional traps» is that improving the performance of one institution can lead to a negative impact on the performance of another institution, and vice versa. Such «institutional traps» can create initially unpredictable threats to a country’s economic security, reducing the effectiveness of public administration. The article presents a theoretical model of the non-transitivity of preference relations between institutions of macroeconomic regulation, and identifies ways to reduce the level of risks associated with the negative manifestation of the non-transitivity of these relations.

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DOI:  https://doi.org/ 10.33917/es-5.179.2021.116-121

Production cooperative (artel) historically is a native Russian form of collective labour activity, aimed, as a rule, at performing certain permanent or temporary work and requiring mutual guarantee of all workers. Artels and their associations are based only on free creative labour (not hired labour), which allows workers themselves to be responsible for efficiency of managing their time and to improve constantly, providing an increase in labour productivity and production profitability. Such work is fundamentally different from the work under an employment contract. Members of cooperatives do not pass “their time” for rationing “from above”, but independently organize their work, revealing their potential, based on personal experience, ingenuity, freedom and personal motivation, effectively interacting with each other in the workforce.

DOI: 10.33917/es-8.166.2019.58-65

Today, the European Union (EU) is facing many challenges in the economic and financial sphere. Europeans are becoming less gullible with EU institutions and less tolerant of supranational interference in domestic politics. As a result, the process of European integration is gradually being modified. It was assumed that the process of economic integration, making Europeans more interdependent, should also lead to cultural assimilation and deeper political integration. Was the project too ambitious, given that Europeans are sufficiently heterogeneous in their economic interests, beliefs and sociocultural values to form a successful political union? Or are current difficulties a consequence of the inefficiency of supranational institutions? And how has the process of European economic integration affected cultural assimilation? All of these issues are becoming increasingly relevant as European integration develops

The lion’s share of credits allocated by banks to the population, is aimed at purchasing imported products and at stimulating economic growth of strategic competitors.