Contemporary Narratives for Applying International Economic Sanctions


Recently the role of sanction restrictions has sharply increased in the practice of regulating economic relations between countries,

meanwhile their application is determined by many factors. At the same time, in the context of intensifying geopolitical competition and growing volatility of the global economy, the dynamics of sanctions application raises more and more questions. On the one hand, economic sanctions are an instrument of coercion for target countries, and on the other hand they make international exchange and cross-border mobility of the factor more and more vulnerable. Heterogeneous nature of the economic sanctions’ impact on sending and target countries does not allow us to say that sanctions are an unambiguous instrument of an effective trade policy.

This article analyzes the key narratives of economic sanctions regimes in all their diversity at the present stage, new forms and

mechanisms of sanctions, as well as their consequences for various aspects of life of the world community.



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